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A model is presented of a uniform price auction where bidders compete in demand 
schedules; the model allows for common and private values in the absence of exogenous 
noise. It is shown how private information yields more market power than the levels seen 
with full information. Results obtained here are broadly consistent with evidence from asset 
auctions, may help explain the response of central banks to the crisis, and suggest potential 
improvements in the auction formats of asset auctions. 
 
JEL codes: D44, D82, G14, E58 
 
Keywords : Adverse selection, market power, reverse auctions, bid shading. 
                                                 
*   The research leading to these results has received funding from the European Research Council under the 
European Advanced Grants scheme, project Information and Competition, Grant Agreement no. 230254. 
For their financial support I also thank the Abertis Chair of Regulation, Competition and Public Policy, 
Project Consolider-Ingenio CSD2006-00016 and project ECO2008-05155 of the Spanish Ministry of 
Education and Science, as well as the Barcelona GSE Research Network and the Generalitat de 
Catalunya. 1. Introduction 
The global financial crisis stemming from subprime mortgage loans has posed a host of 
questions to regulators, treasuries, and central banks. One question concerns the 
effectiveness of auctions in efficiently providing liquidity to financial institutions or 
removing toxic assets from the balance sheets of banks. There are also worries that, during 
the present financial crisis, margins and profits of (Wall Street) dealers have grown 
dramatically at the expense of the Treasury and the Fed.1 
 
Treasury auctions move a large volume of resources and are believed to be subject to 
underpricing.2 For central banks, open-market operations are a crucial instrument for 
providing liquidity to the financial system. The European Central Bank (ECB) typically 
conducts weekly repo auctions (main refinancing operations), and the U.S. Federal Reserve 
holds auctions on a daily basis. Central banks have reacted to the challenge posed by the 
financial crisis by expanding the range of acceptable collateral in refinancing operations 
and by changing typical auction formats. The ECB, for example, changed the variable-rate 
auction tender format to a full-allotment, fixed-rate tender format after the collapse of 
Lehman Brothers. There is also an ongoing debate on how transparent central banks should 
be with the information they have on the banking system, especially in a crisis situation. 
With regard to the auctions of toxic assets, the question is how to avoid overpayment by the 
government while efficiently extracting those assets from the banks in trouble. 
 
In this paper we present a model of a uniform price auction that allows for both common 
and private value components; the model is based on the one developed in Vives (2009), to 
which the reader is referred for a full development and proofs of the results presented here. 
The model in this paper does not incorporate exogenous noise and highlights how market 
power is greater with private information than in the standard case with full information. 
                                                 
1  See “Wall St. profits from Fed role” and Wall St. gets its cut from the Fed and Treasury”, Financial 
Times, August 3, 2009. 
2  More generally, it is known that uniform price auctions are prone to underpricing and demand reduction 
(see, e.g., Ausubel and Cramton 2002). Goswami et al. (1996) confirm in experiments that subjects can 
reach underpricing equilibria with preplay communication. See Keloharju et al. (2005) for evidence on 
Finnish Treasury auctions, Kandel et al. (1999) for IPO (initial public offering) auctions in Israel, and 
Tenorio (1997) for foreign currency auctions in Zambia. 
  2Our model’s results are broadly consistent with evidence from asset auctions; moreover, 
they help explain the response of central banks to the crisis and also suggest potential 
improvements in the auction formats of asset auctions. 
 
The balance of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our model and 
comparative statics results. Section 3 provides a welfare analysis and explains how subsidy 
schemes may induce an efficient allocation. Section 4 derives some conclusions for central 
bank and Treasury auctions, and Section 5 extends the results to reverse auctions and 
comments on tools for removing toxic assets. Proofs of the statements in this paper can all 
be derived from Vives (2009). 
 
 
2. A model of uniform price auctions 
Consider a uniform price auction of   units of an asset with uncertain ex-post value. The 
marginal benefit of buying 
k
i x  units of the asset for bidder  1 i ,...,n =  is  ii x θ λ − , where 
(
2
i N , ) θ θ θσ ∼  with  0 θ > ,  , and 
2 0 θ σ >
2
ij cov , θ θ θρ σ ⎡⎤ = ⎣⎦  for  ji ≠  with  [ ] 01 , ρ∈ . The 
parameter  0 λ >  is an adjustment for transaction costs, opportunity costs, or risk aversion. 
Bidder   receives a private signal  i ii s i θ ε = + , where  ( )
2 0 i N ,ε ε σ ∼ ,   for 
, and   for all   and i. It follows that 
0 ij cov , εε ⎡⎤ = ⎣⎦
ji ≠ 0 ij cov , εθ ⎡⎤ = ⎣⎦ j




i i /n N  , n /n θ θθ θ ρ σ





. Therefore, the 
valuation for a bidder can be decomposed into a common and an idiosyncratic component: 
i θ θη =+   , where  . The model allows for a pure common value ( 0 i cov , ηθ ⎡⎤ = ⎣⎦
  1 ρ = ), 
pure private values ( ), and independent values (
2 0 ε σ = 0 ρ = ). 
 
The profits of bidder   are given by  i ( )
2 2 ii ii p xx / πθ λ =− − , where  p  is the stop-out 
auction price. Bidders maximize expected profits and submit demand schedules, and the 
auctioneer selects a price that clears the market. 
 
  3Examples include a Treasury auction and an open-market central bank operation (to 
provide liquidity for the banking system). In an open-market operation, funds offered by 
the central bank are bid on by each bank on the basis of their individual demand functions. 
The average valuation θ    may be related to the interest rate and/or to prices in the 
secondary interbank market, and λ  reflects the structure of a counterparty’s pool of 
collateral. The bidder bank prefers offering the central bank illiquid collateral in exchange 
for funds, but with an increased allotment the bidder must offer more liquid types of 
collateral at a higher opportunity cost. This explains the declining marginal valuation.3 The 
marginal value  i θ  for funds of bank   is idiosyncratic; it is assessed imperfectly by bank i 
(because, for example, of uncertainty about future liquidity needs), yet it is correlated with 
the values of other banks. Interpreting the model for the case of Treasury auctions, the 
sources of private information could include different expectations about the future resale 
value 
i
θ    of the securities (for instance, bidders have different beliefs regarding future 
inflation, and securities are denominated in nominal terms). As before, bidders may have 
different liquidity needs as a consequence of idiosyncratic shocks.4 
 
The strategy for bidder   is a price-contingent schedule i ( ) i Xs , ⋅ , a map from the signal 
space to the space of demand functions. Given the strategies of bidders ( ) j X s, ⋅ ,  , …, 




j=1 j Xs , p k = ∑ . Let us 
assume that there is a unique market-clearing price  ( )( ) ( ) 1 n ˆ p X s , ,...,X s , ⋅ ⋅  for any 
realization of the signals.
5
 Bidder i’s profits for any such realization are given by 
() () () () ( ) ( ) ( )
2
1 2 in i i i X s , ,...,X s , p X s ,p X s ,p / πθ λ ⋅⋅ = − − , 
                                                 
3  As argued by Ewerhart et al. (2009). 
4  Hortaçsu and Kastl (2008) cannot reject the hypothesis that bidders in Canadian 3-month T-bill auctions 
have private values. Bindseil et al. (2005) argue that the common value component in T-bill auctions is 
more important than in central bank auctions because the primary dealers buy T-bills mostly for resale. 
5  If there is no market-clearing price then we assume that the market shuts down; if there is more than one 
such price then the largest one is chosen. An alternative would be to set the stop-out price as the highest 
price at which aggregate excess demand is nonnegative or, if there is no such price, to set  0 p =  
(implying that the reserve price is 0). See Wang and Zender (2002). 
  4where  () () ( 1 n ˆ ) p p X s , ,...,X s , =⋅ ⋅ . This defines a game in demand functions, and hereafter 
we restrict our attention to symmetric linear Bayesian demand function equilibria 
(LBDFE). If the linear strategies of rivals are given by  ( ) jj X s, p b a s c p = +− ,  j i ≠ , then 
bidder   (provided  ) faces a residual inverse supply  i 0 c > () ( )
1





() () () (
1
11 i ji I nc nb a s k
−
≠ =− −+ − ∑ . All the information that the price provides to 
bidder   about the signals of others is contained in the intercept  i i I . The information 
available to bidder i is therefore { } i s,p  or { } ii s, I . Bidder i chooses  i x  to maximize 
() () () ( )
1 22 1
22




⎡⎤ = ⎡⎤ − − = ⎡⎤ − − − − ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦  
 
The first-order condition is6  () ( )
1
21 iii i i i Es , II nc xx θλ
−
⎡⎤ − − − − = ⎣⎦ 0  or, equivalently, 




≡− . An equilibrium also requires that 
.  0 a >
 
Proposition 1. Let  . Then there is a unique symmetric LBDFE if and only if 
, where 
22 / εθ σσ <∞
2 nM −− > 0











−+ + − σ
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In equilibrium we have that  () 11 0 /M c λ + >> 0 a > ,  ,   decreases with  c M and with  λ , 
and d  is decreasing in n. 
 
                                                 
6  The second-order sufficient condition is fulfilled when  .  0 c >
  5From the market-clearing condition we obtain  ( )
1 p ba s c k / n
− =+ −   , where 
() ( ) i i ss n θε ≡= + ∑∑     i i n ; therefore, the price  p  reveals the aggregate information  . 
The equilibrium is privately revealing—in other words, for bidder i, either (
s  
) i s,p  or 
 is a sufficient statistic for evaluating ( i s, s  ) i θ , the joint information in the 
market . In particular, and given the normality of random variables, in 
equilibrium we have that 
( 1 n s s ,...,s = )
ii i i i i t E s,p E s, s E s θθ ≡⎡ ⎤ =⎡ ⎤ =⎡ ⎤ ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦ ⎣   θ ⎦ . 
 
Suppose that there is no correlation ( 0 ρ = ) between the value parameters or that signals 
are perfect (
22 0 / εθ σσ = ).7 Then  0 M = ,  ii i ii E s,p E s E s θθ θ ⎡ ⎤= ⎡ ⎤= ⎡ ⎤ ⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦⎣⎦ , and bidder i 
does not learn about  i θ  from prices. In this case the LBDFE coincides with the full-
information equilibrium (denoted by superscript  f  and for which  ()
1 - ff c dc λ = +> ). For 
example, if   then 
2 0 ε σ = () ( )
f
ii X, pc p θθ = − . Otherwise, if  0 ρ >  or  , then 
bidders learn from prices and demand functions are steeper: 
22 0 / εθ σσ >
f cc <  (and 
f dd > ). Indeed, 
the larger is M  (which is increasing in ρ  and in 
2 /
2
ε θ σ σ ), the more that price serves an 
information role of the common value component and the steeper are the demand functions 
(lower  ). The response to a price increase is to reduce the amount demanded, but 
moderately since a high price conveys the good news that the average valuation is high. 
Likewise, a bidder refrains from competing aggressively with his demand function because 
a low price conveys the bad news that valuations are low. 
c
 
Private information yields market power that exceeds the full-information level. For ρ  or 
2 /
2
ε θ σ σ  high enough, the linear equilibrium collapses as M  increases:   and 
 (in which case   and bidder i’s demand approaches zero). This happens 
owing to the combination of adverse selection and market power: the demand schedules 
20 n- -M →
0 c → d →∞
                                                 
7  In this case the equilibrium is independent of  ρ . 
  6become too inelastic to sustain an equilibrium.8 The market tends to collapse when the 
common value element is more important (ρ  high), signals are noisy (
2
ε σ  high), and/or 
prior uncertainty is low (
2
θ σ  low). This means, in particular, that a large enough prior 
precision (a raise in 
2 1/ θ σ ) may cause the market to collapse unless 
2
ε σ  increases also.9 
This is akin to asymmetric information models in which traders submit steeper schedules so 
as to protect themselves against adverse selection (Kyle 1989; Biais et al. 2000; Wang and 
Zender 2002). Indeed, the phenomenon is similar to the so-called winner’s curse in 
common value auctions (Milgrom and Weber 1982): the more that bidders shade their bid 
to protect against the winner’s curse, the less precise their signals are. In Kyle (1989) and 
also in Wang and Zender (2002), a linear equilibrium exists only if the number of informed 
traders is no less than 3 (when there are no uninformed traders). We also need   in our 
model to obtain a linear equilibrium. 
3 n ≥
 




ii ii EsEsn Esn t θθ θ
−−
== ⎡⎤ ⎡⎤ == ⎡ ⎤ = ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦ t ≡ ∑ ∑        .10 
Bid shading is directly related to the equilibrium parameter d. From the demand function of 
bidder   we have that  i () ii p td x λ =− + , and a price-taking bidder would submit the 
schedule (with  ) that coincides with her marginal valuation. From market clearing 
and the equilibrium bids it is immediate that 
0 d =
( ) p t- d k/n λ =+   . Let the amount of bid 
shading be dk , the difference between the auction price and the average marginal 
valuation 
/ n
tk / n λ −   . Because   is of order 1 , shading must be of order  . If the 
amount to be auctioned grows with   (say, 
d /n
2 1/n
n n kk n = ), then bid shading is of order 1 . 
The following proposition summarizes the comparative statics results. 
/n
                                                 
8  We do not examine the potential existence of nonlinear equilibria. It is worth noting that, in Bhattacharya 
and Spiegel (1991), if the linear equilibrium fails to exist then there is no other equilibrium except a 
degenerate, no-trade one. 
9     As  (in which case
22 /
εθ σσ →∞ ( ) 1 Mn / ρ →− ), the equilibrium in Proposition 1 also collapses, even 
if  ( 21 n- n/ - > ) ρρ , because  . However, in the limit   there is another linear 




1 ρ = ) in which  ( ) ( )
f X pc p =− θ  (since  [ ] i Es , p θ θ = ). 
10  The first equality holds because s    is a sufficient statistic for s  in relation to θ   . 
  7 
Proposition 2.  At the LBDFE, with  20 nM − −>   and  ,  the following 
statements hold. 
22 / εθ σσ <∞
(i)  The slope of equilibrium demand is steeper (c is smaller)  with increases in  ρ , 
2 /
2
ε θ σ σ , and λ . 
(ii)  The amount of bid shading is increasing—and the expected price 
[ ] () Ep d q / n θλ =− +  is decreasing—in ρ , 
22 / ε θ σ σ , k , and 1 .  /n
(iii)  Price volatility  [ ] var p var ξ θ ⎡ ⎤ = ⎣ ⎦
    decreases with 
2
ε σ   and increases with  ρ   and 
2
θ σ .11 
 
In the auction literature, the “linkage principle” states that, on average, providing bidders 
with more information about a good’s value increases the revenue of the seller. This 
dynamic has been associated with mitigating the winner’s curse (Milgrom and Weber 
1982).  In our auction model, increased prior precision (higher 
2 1/ θ σ ) enhances the 
informational role of the price, making bidders more cautious (see Perry and Reny (1999) 
for a discussion of the failure of the linkage principle in multi-object auctions).  
 
The results have implications for the liquidity auctions of central banks. In the asset auction 
there is a discount with respect to the expectation of the secondary-market or average value 
E s θ ⎡ ⎣
   ⎤ ⎦ , since  () p Es d k / θλ ⎡⎤ =− + ⎣⎦
    n . As the volatility of fundamentals 
2
θ σ  increases, 
the discount decreases. In periods with high liquidity of collateral (low λ ), bid schedules 
are very flat. Increasing the size ( ) of the auction or providing more public information 
(higher 
k
2 1/ θ σ ) leads to an increased discount. All of these effects are documented features 
of the ECB euro auctions (Ewerhart et al. 2009).12 
 
                                                 
11 Note  that  [ ] [ ] [ ]
2 var p var t var E s var s var θ ξξ == = = ⎡⎤ θ ⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤ ⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎣⎦
        ⎦ , where 
() 1 Es s θ ξξ =+ − ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦
     θ  and  ( )
2 var / var / n ε ξθ θ σ ≡+ ⎡⎤ ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦
   . 
12  However, the ECB auctions in the period examined were discriminatory whereas ours is a uniform-price 
model. 
  8The results also illustrate the impact of a crisis situation. The more severe the information 
problem (a larger ρ or 
2 /
2
ε θ σ σ ) or the more costly it is to put up more liquid collateral 
(higher λ ), the steeper are demand functions, the larger are the equilibrium margin and the 
amount of bid shading, and the more inefficiently  the funds are allocated (in the extreme, 
the linear equilibrium may break down). Cassola et al. (2009) study ECB auctions and 
show that, after the subprime crisis in August 2007, marginal valuations for funds of banks 
increased and the aggregate bid curve was steeper; there was also increased bid shading 




The strategies at a LBDFE induce quantity and price outcomes as a function of the realized 




= , and  () p t . The 
auction outcome solves the following distorted benefit maximization program: 
() () ( ) { }
1
2
11 2     n
i i
nn
ii i i ii x M ax E x d x / t s.t. x k θλ
= ==
⎡⎤ −+ = ⎣⎦ ∑∑ , 










,  , …,  . The efficient allocation would obtain if we set 
. Then it can be checked that the total optimized benefit 
1 i = n
0 d =




ii i ii i ii B k ; t , d E xt xt / t t xt xt / θλ λ
==
⎡⎤ ≡− = − ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦ ∑∑  
is decreasing in  . Given that  and that  d 0
f dd >>
f d  is independent of 
2  and  ε ρ σ  (and is 
decreasing in  ), our next proposition follows immediately.  n
 
Proposition 3. For a given realization of predicted values  , inefficiency is increasing in d . 
As a consequence, for given  : as 
t
t ρ  or 
2
ε σ  increases, the inefficiency due to information-
induced market power ( ) increases; and as   increases, both the inefficiency due to 
standard market power (
f dd − n
f d ) and overall efficiency (d ) decrease. 
 
  9Remark: The comparative statics of the expected deadweight loss (DWL) at the LBDFE 
with respect to ρ  or 
2
ε σ  must also take into account the averaging over predicted values. It 




ii nE x x / λ ⎡⎤ − ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦
   and that 
() () () ()
2 2 2 1 1 c
ii i E xx d E tt λλ
− − ⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ −= − + − ⎢⎥ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣⎦
  . According to simulations,  ()
2
i E tt ⎡⎤ − ⎣⎦
   is 
decreasing in ρ  and
2
ε σ . The reason is that an increase in either parameter tends to 
align  probabilistically. The result is that DWL may increase or decrease in     i t and t   ρ  and 
in 
2
ε σ . If   (resp. 
2 0 ε σ = 0 ρ = ), then   is independent of  d ρ  (resp. 
2
ε σ ) and inefficiency 
decreases in ρ  (resp. 
2
ε σ ). 
 
Provided that  1 ρ <  and 
22 / εθ σσ < ∞, the efficient full-information allocation is 
implemented by a symmetric price-taking LBDFE (denoted by a superscript “c”, for 
“competitive”, on the coefficients). The equilibrium strategy of bidder i will be of the form 
; it will arise from the maximization of expected profits, taking 
prices as given but using the information contained in the price: 
()
cc c





i xi i i i Max E s ,p p x x
λ
θ ⎧ ⎫ ⎡⎤ − − ⎨ ⎬ ⎣⎦ ⎩⎭
. 
 
This optimization will yield the following system of first-order conditions: 
ii i p Es , p x θ λ =⎡ ⎤ − ⎣⎦  for  , ...,  . If   then, as in the strategic case,   reveals  ,  1 i = n 0
c c > p s  
ii ii E s,p E s, s θθ ⎡⎤ = ⎡ ⎣⎦ ⎣  ⎤ ⎦ , and the price-taking LBDFE implements the efficient solution; in 
equilibrium,  p tk / n λ =−   . In summary, if  1 ρ <  and 
22 / εθ σσ < ∞, then there is a unique 
symmetric price-taking LBDFE and it implements the efficient allocation. The situation is 
as in Proposition 1 with   and  0 d = ( ) ( ) 11
c c/M λ = + . 
 
The price-taking demand function will coincide with the marginal benefit schedule only 
when there is no learning from prices (i.e., only if  0 M = ). A bidder’s demand function is 
always flatter in the price-taking equilibrium than in the strategic equilibrium: 
  10() ()
1
1
c cc n λ
−
−= − > 0 . Furthermore, bidders are more cautious in responding to their 
private signals in the strategic case:  { } () { }
1 1 0
c sgn a a sgn d λλ
− − − =− + >
c a
. By the same 





That the auction outcome can be obtained as the solution to a distorted planning problem 
with a more concave objective suggests that inefficiency may be eliminated by a quadratic 
subsidy 
2 2 i x / κ  that compensates for the distortion  .13 The question is whether we 
can find a   such that 
2 2 i dx /
0 κ > ( ) d λ κκ −+ = λ  or  ( ) d κ κ = , where  () ( )( ) ()
1
1 dn c κλ κ
−
≡− −  
is the (endogenous) distortion when the slope of marginal benefits is λ κ − . In this case a 
bidder would, in effect, act as if he were competitive and facing a marginal benefit with 
slope λ . Our question is answered by the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 4.  Let  1 ρ < .  Then a quadratic subsidy    with 
  induces an efficient allocation because then 
bidders “act competitively”. The subsidy 
2 2 i *x / κ
() ( ) () () (
1
11
c *nc M / n κλ λ
−
=− =+ − ) 1
* κ  increases with  ρ , 
2 /
2
ε θ σ σ , and  λ , and it 
decreases with n. 
 
 
4. Implications for central bank and Treasury auctions 
A central bank has two main objectives in the liquidity auctions. The first is to inject the 
right amount of money so that the short-term rate stays close to its target level; the second 
is to provide appropriate liquidity to the banks.14 A fixed-quantity auction exactly controls 
the aggregate amount of money injected and has a “price discovery” purpose of eliciting 
the values for liquidity of the banks. However, there is an inefficiency in the distribution of 
liquidity that can be substantial when 
2  and/or  /
2
ε θ ρ σσ  are large—which may be precisely 
                                                 
13  Given the work of Angeletos and Pavan (2009), who develop a similar approach, it would be worth 
exploring whether efficiency could be implemented by a linear state-contingent tax. 
14  See Ayuso and Repullo (2003) for a model of the ECB’s open-market operations. 
  11the case in a crisis situation. In contrast, a fixed-price tender only indirectly controls the 
amount of money injected and does not feature price discovery, but it does eliminate any 
inefficiency in the distribution of liquidity because the banks bid competitively. In a crisis 
situation, controlling the total amount of liquidity takes a back seat to making enough 
liquidity available to the banks, and this fact explains why the fixed-rate tender may be 
preferable in this case. Since the collapse of Lehman Brothers, the ECB is accepting the 
banks’ demands in full at a fixed rate rather than following the usual auction procedure, 
where banks bid for money and thereby set the interest rate. More generally, it may be a 
good idea to introduce some elasticity in the supply schedule of the central bank, since the 
fixed-price tenders are one (horizontal) extreme and the fixed-quantity auctions are another 
(vertical) extreme. The analysis in Vives (2009) suggests that an optimal demand schedule 
for the central bank should be more elastic when the information problem is more severe.15 
 
Another way to reduce inefficiency in the distribution of liquidity is to lower λ by 
accepting lower-quality collateral from the banks in the repo auctions. This is what most 
central banks have done in response to the crisis, and it is equivalent to a quadratic subsidy 
(increasing with 
2  and  /
2
ε θ ρ σσ  and decreasing with  ) in our framework.   n
 
A similar analysis applies to Treasury auctions. 
 
 
5. Reverse auctions 
Our model can readily accommodate supply bids for an inelastic demand. The model should 
be reinterpreted with a change of variables in which the supply of bidder i is  .  ii yx ≡−
 
In the initial Paulson plan of October 2008, reverse auctions were suggested as mechanisms 
to extract toxic assets from banks’ balance sheets. In subsequent plans, auctions have been 
                                                 
15  LiCalzi and Pavan (2005) study a case with no asymmetric information. 
  12center stage as a means of removing legacy loans.16 The Federal Reserve is also 
considering reverse auctions to mop up excess liquidity in a post-crisis scenario.17 
 
In a reverse auction, the buyer (say, the U.S. Treasury) announces an amount of a certain 
class of securities (say, residential mortgage-backed securities based on California property 
of a certain face value, vintage, and type) that it seeks to buy. Those securities are in the 
hands of multiple banks, and the Treasury wants to buy a certain proportion of them. The 
marginal value of the security to a bank reflects not only the intrinsic value (to the bank) of 
the security but also the liquidity needs of the bank (both are correlated across institutions). 
The bank has an imperfect estimate of security values. It will first sell the worst 
securities—that is, the ones whose underlying mortgages are believed to have the lowest 
probability of repayment—and will sell better securities only when necessary. As a result, 
the marginal cost of selling securities is increasing. The parameter λ  reflects the “quality 
heterogeneity” of the bank’s securities (the larger is λ , the more quickly the bank’s 
portfolio improves as the lemons are sold). In a crisis situation, λ  will tend to be higher 
because the quality heterogeneity of the securities will increase. 
 
The Treasury is uninformed about the value of the securities, and the reverse auction will 
serve the price discovery purpose of eliciting the average value θ   . Banks that value the 
security less or that have greater liquidity needs will sell more. Yet because the values are 
highly correlated, competition will be softened and the Treasury will pay much more than 
the competitive price for the securities. Information that is released by the Treasury would 
aggravate the distortion. In the extreme, with few sellers and high adverse selection, the 
market may collapse. As mentioned previously, the Treasury may benefit by setting an 
elastic demand schedule to control market power and avoid a market breakdown. 
 
                                                 
16  Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008. 
17  See Ausubel and Cramton (2008) and Klemperer (2009) for proposals on how to design the auctions. 
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